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The purpose of this paper is to amend the resource-based view of strategic management 
from an entrepreneurial point of view. We firstly attempt to make a brief survey of the 
conceptual framework of the RBV by contrasting it with the competitive forces approach 
(CFA) presented by Porter (1980). Secondly, we clarify the objectives of corporate strategy 
through a critical assessment of the RBV from both a static and a dynamic point of view. 
Finally, we suggest a new perspective of the RBV by amending it from an entrepreneurial 




  1INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this paper is to amend the resource-based view (RBV) of strategic 
management from an entrepreneurial point of view. Many scholars have attempted to 
investigate into the mechanism of sustainable competitive advantage of a firm through the 
RBV with original concepts such as ‘core competence’ (e.g., Hamel & Praharad, 1994), 
‘dynamic capability’ (e.g., Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997) ‘VRIO framework’ (Barney, 
2002), ‘capability lifecycle’ (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003), and ‘routine and skills’ (e.g., Nelson 
& Winter, 1982). However little work in RBV has been made to grasp the role of 
entrepreneurship as the crucial source of competitive advantage, despite the abilities of the 
entrepreneur are undoubtedly the principal human resources possessed by firms (see 
Alvarez & Barney, 2000 for an exception). This paper attempts to incorporate the theory of 
entrepreneurship into the RBV of strategic management, while critically dealing with the 
RBV from an entrepreneurial viewpoint. 
    The  paper  is  divided  into tree parts. First, a brief survey is given of the conceptual 
framework of the RBV. It is helpful for us to grasp the characteristics of its framework by 
contrasting with the competitive forces approach (CFA) presented by Porter (1980), because 
it is said that the CFA explores the source of sustainable competitive advantage in the 
external environment of the firm (i.e., attractiveness of industry where they are located), 
while the RBV pays attention to the internal resources of the firm (i.e., the heterogeneous 
resources that a firm possesses). Second, we clarify the objectives of corporate strategy 
through a critical assessment of the RBV from both a static and a dynamic point of view. 
Barney’s fundamental concept of the RBV is examined. Third, we suggest a new 
perspective of the RBV by amending it from an entrepreneurial viewpoint, and then take 
some examples to illustrate the new perspective for further empirical studies.  
 
 
1. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE RBV 
 
1.1 Strategy and External Environment of a Firm     
Traditional research on strategic management suggests that firms need to seek a strategic fit 
between the external environment; i.e., opportunities and threats, and internal resources; i.e., 
strengths and weaknesses (e.g., Andrews, 1967; Itami, 1987). However, considerable 
emphasis has usually been given to a firm’s competitive environment and its competitive 
position (Das & Teng, 2000). Considering the source of sustainable competitive advantage 
of a firm, it is widely accepted that the dominant viewpoint in the strategic management 
theory throughout the 1980s was the CFA presented by Porter (1980). His conceptual 
framework was mainly based on the structure-conduct-performance paradigm of the theory 
of industrial organization (Bain, 1959; Mason, 1949). It is no exaggeration to say that Porter 
(1980) specifically brings a concept of ‘competition’ for the first time in strategic 
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consistent framework for thought so as to examine concrete questions like “how will a firm 
able to get a competitive advantage over its competitors?”  
In the CFA, the industrial structure strongly influences the rules of competition, as well 
as the strategies potentially available to the firms belonging to that industry. Therefore the 
strategic issue for a firm seems to concern their competitive positioning in the industry. 
They seek a favorable position in order to gain a monopoly rent (Teece, 1984), while 
avoiding involvement in competition or moderating competitive pressures by influencing 
industry structure and their competitors’ behavior. To help the firm find such a positioning 
in the industry, Porter (1980) advanced a ‘five-force model’. This consists of five industry-
level forces: i.e., entry barriers, threat of substitution, bargaining power of supplier, 
bargaining power of buyer and rivalry among industry incumbents, which determine the 
inherent profit potential of an industry or sub-segment of it.  
However, a series of empirical surveys have failed to support the link between industrial 
structure and the performance of a firm. Some studies show the variance in firm 
performance between industries is substantially less than that within industries (e.g., 
Jacobson, 1988; Hansen & Wernerfelt, 1989; Rumelt, 1991). Others also identify systematic 
and significant performance differences among firms which belong to the same strategic 
group within an industry (Cool & Schendel, 1988). Research has suggested that the internal 
resources of a firm rather than the external environment around the firm are possibly the 
primary source of performance differences among firms. This result is bringing a growing 
number of researchers to the RBV of strategic management to explain the differences by 
focusing their attention on resource heterogeneity in an industry and the source of 
sustainable competitive advantage of the firms.   
         
1.2 Strategy and Internal Resources of a Firm  
Since the mid 1980s, the RBV has emerged as one of the substantial theories of strategic 
management (Barney, 1986a; Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1984), even though it is said that 
the RBV does not presently appear to meet the empirical content criterion required of a 
theoretical system (Bacharach, 1989; Hunt, 1991; McKelvey, 1997; Priem & Butler, 
2001a,b). The increased attention to firms’ resources by researchers has seemed to be 
beneficial in helping to clarify the potential contributions of resources to competitive 
advantage, as well as to introduce strategy scholars to a number of useful descriptive 
theories from industrial organization economics (e.g., Alchian & Demsetz, 1972, on 
‘teamwork’ production, or DeVany & Saving, 1983, on price as a signal of quality), and 
furthermore to alleviate a previous analytical overemphasis on the opportunities and threats 
that arise from the product side (Priem & Butler, 2001a). 
The RBV suggests that the resources possessed by a firm are the primary determinants of 
its performance, and these may contribute to a sustainable competitive advantage of the firm 
(e.g., Hoffer & Schendel, 1978; Wenerfelt, 1984). According to Barney (1991), the concept 
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information, knowledge, etc. controlled by a firm that enable the firm to conceive of and 
implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness (Barney, 1991; Daft, 
1983).  
In the early stage of the RBV, the main concern was to identify the characteristics of 
resources that are not subject to imitation by competitors. If the resources possessed by a 
firm can easily be replicated by competitors, even though the resources are the source of 
competitive advantage of the firm, then the advantage will not last long. Dierickx & Cool 
(1989a) describe how the sustainability of a firm’s asset position hinges on how easily its 
resources can be substituted or imitated, and imitability is linked to the characteristics of the 
asset accumulation process: i.e., time compression diseconomies, asset mass efficiencies, 
inter-connectedness, asset erosion and casual ambiguity. In the same way, several other 
characteristics have been explored such as unique historical conditions, causal ambiguity 
(Reed & DeFillippi, 1990), social complexity, isolating mechanism and so on (Barney, 
1991; Lippman & Rumelt, 1982; Rumelt, 1984). 
 
1.3 Resources and Capability 
Let us develop the concept of resources a little further. For instance, Grant (1991) notes the 
distinction between resources and capability as follows: 
 
Resources are inputs into the production process … [they] include items of capital 
equipment, skills of individual employees, patents, brand names, finance, and so on. But, 
on their own, few resources are productive. Productive activity requires the cooperation 
and coordination of teams of resources. A capability is the capacity for a team of 
resources to perform some task or activity. (Grant, 1991: 118-119) 
  
In the same manner, Amit & Schoemaker (1993) define resources as stocks of available 
factors that are owned or controlled by the firm, which are converted into final products or 
services. Capabilities, in contrast, refer to a firm’s capacity to deploy resources, usually in 
combination, using organizational processes, to produce a desired effect. Hence, the 
presence of capability enables resources to begin to be utilized, and the potential for the 
creation of output arises. While resources are the source of a firm’s capabilities, capabilities 
are the main source of its competitive advantage (Grant, 1991). The important point of this 
approach compared to the early stage of RBV is that, for the sake of gaining a sustainable 
competitive advantage, capability is regarded as more important than resources per se, and 
  4this implies that the firm-specific way of cooperation and coordination of resources causes 
the heterogeneity among firms in an industry
1. 
This thought can be theoretically traced back to Penrose’s (1959) work. She regards a 
firm as more than an administrative unit, it is also a collection of productive resources 
which including the both physical and human resources. According to Penrose, it is never 
‘resources’ per se that are the ‘inputs’ in the production process, but only the ‘services’ that 
the resource can render, that is, “The services yielded by resources are a function of the way 
in which they are used―exactly the same resources when used for different purposes or in 
different ways and in combination with different types of or amounts of other resources 
provide a different service or set of services. The important distinction between resources 
and services is not their relative durability; rather it lies in the fact that resources consists of 
a bundle of potential services and can, for the most part, be define independently of their 
use, while services cannot be so defined, the very word ‘service’ implying a function, an 
activity. As we shall see, it is largely in this distinction that we find the source of the 
uniqueness of each individual firm” (1959: 25).   
The result of this is that the concept of ‘capability’ is the capacity of a firm to convert 
resources they possess into the ‘service’.  The relationship can be formulated as 
  
S = f (C, R)      
for some general function f (.) so that C and R are the parameters of S, where C is 
capacity of capability, R is resources, and S is service. 
 
The difference, or possibly the uniqueness, of a firm largely comes from these capabilities. 
Much recent research in this area has been based on empirical studies of the firm-specific 
ways of cooperation and coordination that bring sustainable competitive advantages for the 
firm (e.g., Fujimoto, 1999; Iansiti, 1998).  
 
 
2. CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE RBV 
 
2.1 Examine the RBV from a Static Viewpoint  
Having made a brief survey of the conceptual framework of the RBV by contrasting with 
the CFA, we now attempt to clarify the objective of corporate strategy through a critical 
assessment of the RBV. Barney’s (1986a, 1991, 2001) conceptual framework of the RBV 
has been used, because as Priem & Butler (2001a) remark, many RBV proponents either 
paraphrase his statements or simply cite his articles (i.e., Barney, 1991), without an 
                                                 
1  To deepen the concept of capability, Grant (1991) invokes the concept of  ‘organizational routine’ from 
evolutionary theory (e.g., Nelson, 1991). He views capability as a routine or a number of interacting routines, 
and organization as a huge network of routines.      
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1992a, b; Rindova & Fombrun, 1999; Yeoh & Roth, 1999), and operate under his 
framework in their conceptual and empirical work
2. His (1991: 105-106) conceptual 
framework may be paraphrased as follows (1991: 105-106): 
 
Firstly we make two assumptions in analyzing sources of sustained competitive 
advantage: (Ⅰ) firms within an industry (or group) may be heterogeneous with respect 
to the strategic resource they control, and (Ⅱ) these resources may not be perfectly 
mobile across firms, and thus heterogeneity can be long lasting. Under these 
assumptions, we assert that the resource must have four attributes: (a) it must be 
valuable, in the sense that it exploit opportunities and/or neutralizes threats in a firm’s 
environment, (b) it must be rare among a firm’s current and potential competition, (c) it 
must be imperfectly imitable, and (d) there cannot be strategically equivalent substitutes 
for this resource that are valuable but neither rare or imperfectly imitable. Conditions (a) 
and (b) produce competitive advantage, and (c) and (d) relate to sustainability. 
 
Two points should be noted here regarding this argument. Firstly, Barney’s concept of 
‘valuable’
3 is an ambiguous benchmark with which to measure the competitive advantage of 
a firm. Whether the resource is valuable or not ought to be measured by its profitability, and 
thus it takes the form of an economic asset regardless of how tangible or intangible it is. The 
value of any resource should be measured by the discounted value of the expected future 
income (or rent) stream that can be attributed to it.  
In the RBV the valuable endowments of a firm are taken as given. The planning and 
investment necessary to build up such resources are exogenous in this framework. This 
means there is the fear that the RBV will overstate the profitability of firms exploiting these 
resources, because they ignore the cost of acquisition and accumulation. Therefore it is 
impossible for the RBV to explain why firms invest in such a valuable resource rather than 
in other type of resources. In addition, if the firms want to realize their competitive 
advantage or maximize their profit (i.e., super-normal profit in the Marshallian sense) from 
                                                 
2  Priem and Butler investigate whether the RBV arguments regarding competitive advantage meet the 
generally accepted criteria for classifying a set of statements as a theory, See Priem & Butler (2001a, b) and 
also Barney’s counter-argument (Barney, 2001).  
3  He defines valuable resources in variety of ways, for example: a firm’s resources and capabilities are 
valuable if, and only if, they reduce a firm’s net cost or increase its revenues compared to what would have 
been the case if this firm did not possess those resources (2002: 162); a firm’s resources and capabilities are 
valuable if, and only if, they reduce a firm’s net cost or increase its revenues compare itself to with other 
successful firms (2002: 188: footnote 23). These definitions take account of the cost of acquiring these 
resources, however it is still incompetent to fulfill the conditions for acquiring and realizing a competitive 
advantage. 
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that influence on the final price of their output. The values of resources are determined by 
demand-side characteristics, and those are also exogenous to the RBV model (Priem & 
Butler, 2001a, b). We never have a priori information on the competitive advantage among 
firms that will result in super-normal profit, on the contrary, we know a posteriori the 
existence of the competitive advantage by virtue of the existence of super-normal profit. 
After all, the emphasis is on how to sustain such a valuable resource over the long term 
without adequate appreciation of its economic value. Therefore it is open to criticism that 
the RBV contains a theory of sustainability but not a theory of competitive advantage 
(Priem & Butler, 2001b).  
Secondly, the concept of a ‘rare’ resource does not necessarily ensure the competitive 
advantage of the firm, even if that resource generates a large ‘rent’ due to its relative 
scarcity. In The Wealth of Nations, Smith had already recognized this point. He stated:   
 
[I]f the one species of labour requires an uncommon degree of dexterity and ingenuity, 
the esteem which men have for such talents will naturally give a value to their produce, 
superior to what would be due to the time employed about it. Such talents can seldom be 
acquired but in consequence of long application, and the superior value of their produce 
may frequently be no more than a reasonable compensation for the time and labour 
which must be spent in acquire them. (Smith, 2000 [1776]: 53)    
 
Rents are the prices of services yielded by resources (Lewin & Phelan, 2002).  In this phase 
rent is nothing more than the rental price of the service of the resource whether it is rare or 
not. After remunerating all the factors of production, no profit has been left to the firm 
(Demsetz, 1973; Barney, 1986a; Rumelt, 1987). If there is a firm gaining profit from the 
resource, it is simply that the firm squeezes some part of the rent from the owner of the 
resources.  
Many RBV researchers identify the concept of ‘rent’ (e.g., Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; 
Petaraf, 1993; Rumelt, 1987), that is expressed in various forms, i.e., Ricardian rent, 
Marshallian rent, Paretian rent, and quasi-rent, as those, which accrue from the relative 
differentiation of resources a firm control
4. They consider the concept of ‘competition’ as 
the states that firms compete in factors of production markets over the relative advantage of 
the resources they acquire or accumulate, rather than compete in final-product markets over 
the price of their products and services.  
                                                 
4  We have to bear in mind the fact that rent will be paid even though all of land is homogeneous or even if the 
land is not fertile. Rent is not paid due to the relative difference of the land’s fertility but by the fact that land 
is merely scarce (Lewin & Phelan, 2002). The difference in fertility reflects in the diference in rental rates, 
however, the rental rate is nothing to do with the profitability of a firm. The owner of any resources just asks 
for the rents (i.e., wage, rent, and interest) according to its rate.    
  7However, from the static point of view, all of the relative advantages of these resources 
ought to be compensated for their owner. And the source of competitive advantage of the 
firm remains only by their monopoly rent. In this case alone, a firm would be able to gain 
super-normal profit at the cost of social welfare. It follows from what has been said, that the 
RBV contains the conditions of sustainability, but it does not fulfill the conditions for 
acquiring and realizing a competitive advantage. Only firms that already possess a 
competitive advantage are qualified to adopt the RBV in order to secure its monopolistic 
positioning. 
      
2.2 Examine the RBV from a Dynamic Viewpoint 
Given that the RBV is nothing more than an indication of the condition for competitive 
firms to sustain their advantage, how can we investigate the academic value in the RBV in 
terms of explaining the source of the competitive advantage of a firm? By examining 
Barney’s (1986a, 2001) research, we see that he might recognize the existence of super-
normal profit and the source of competitive advantage besides valuable and rare resources. 
The ‘strategic factor market imperfection’ is the key concept for finding the academic value 
in the RBV.  
The strategic factor markets are developed when a firm requires the acquisition of 
resources in order to implement its strategy (Barney, 1986a). These markets are where firms 
buy and sell the resources necessary to implement their strategies (Barney, 1986a; 
Hirshleifer, 1980). Hence the economic performance of the firms depends not only on the 
returns from their strategies but also on the cost of buying the resources from these markets 
to implement those strategies. And the costs of those resources are determined by the 
characteristics of the factor markets. Relevant to this point is Barney’s following remark:  
 
The existence of strategic factor markets has important implications for return to product 
market strategies implemented by firms, for the size of returns to product market 
strategies will depend on the cost of the resources necessary to implement them. And the 
cost of these resources will depend on the competitive characteristics of the relevant 
strategic factor markets. If strategic factor markets are perfectly competitive …[then] 
firms will only be able to obtain normal returns from acquiring strategic resources and 
implementing strategies. Firms can only obtain greater than normal returns …[then] 
when the cost of resources to implement those strategies is significantly less than their 
economic value, i.e., when firms create or exploit competitive imperfections in strategic 
factor markets. (Barney, 1986a: 1232).   
 
This remark shows that valuable and rare resources are not the source of competitive 
advantage or above normal return if the cost of acquiring or developing these resources 
equals the value they create when used to conceive of and implement a strategy. However, 
there is an implied possibility that the competitive advantage may come from the 
  8imperfections in strategic factor markets. Different firms in these markets will have 
different expectations about the future value of a strategy that creates this imperfection 
(Ibid., 1986a), and the owners of the firm also have different expectations about the future 
return of their resources (Ibid., 2001). Therefore, different expectations toward the 
resources produce the possibility of a competitive advantage for a firm. This kind of 
competitive advantage, named ‘economic rents’ by Barney, reflect the creative and 
entrepreneurial ability of firms to discover how to generate value with their resources in 
ways that other firms and outside owners cannot anticipate (Ibid., 1986a, 2001). Firms that 
intend to obtain a competitive advantage must be consistently better informed concerning 
the future value of these resources than other firms.  
Examining the Barney’s concept of ‘strategic factor market imperfection’, we are able to 
interpret that the characteristics of ‘competition’ are not in the world of static states 
(equilibrium), but in the world of dynamic processes of change (disequilibrium). As 
mentioned above, no rents emerge in the world of static states. Lewin & Phelan clearly 
describe this point: 
 
If the price of any resource reflects the discounted value of its expected future earnings, 
and if everyone shares the same correct expectations, then that price includes all correctly 
anticipated value components. There are no strategic decisions to be made. Ex ante 
values will turn out to be equal to ex post values. There will be no ‘surplus’ or ‘abnormal’ 
rents, because all resource owners, whether they sell or rent their resource, will correctly 
impute any value added by their resource to any production process of which they (the 
resources) are a part. Resource users will thus treat these rents as a cost. There is no 
discrepancy between total cost and total revenue and both equal total rents earned. 
(Lewin & Phelan, 2002: 234) 
 
Unless there is a difference between the ex post value of a venture and the ex ante cost of 
acquiring the necessary resources, the entrepreneurial rents are zero (Rumelt, 1987; Peteraf, 
1993). In a dynamic sense, such a situation cannot exist because a price of any resource 
reflects the discounted value of its expected future earnings, so everyone shares the same 
correct expectations towards it and the price includes all correctly anticipated value 
components. The possibility of profit comes from ex ante risk and uncertainty, the 
probability of profit comes from ex post realization of certain value. In this sense, the size of 
super-normal profit, thus the competitive advantage of a firm, depends on the difference 
between the ex ante cost of resources and the ex post value of them. This suggests that to 
acquire a competitive advantage is no more and no less than to obtain the entrepreneurial 
rents. We may say that the academic values can be found in the RBV when we view it in a 
dynamic context. 
   
 
  93. AMENDING THE RBV 
 
3.1 Entrepreneur as a Resource 
In case firms obtain a competitive advantage, resource heterogeneity does not necessarily 
require by itself. In the dynamic world, the heterogeneous perceptions are more important 
than the heterogeneous resources per se (Lewin, 2005; Lewin & Phelan, 2002). As a matter 
of course, such perception originates in the asymmetric information among firms. This 
drives us, logically, to the situation that the function of ‘entrepreneurship’ and also the 
ability to perceive market imperfection of information have to be incorporated into the RBV. 
How to best evade the market imperfection or how to make good use of that imperfection is 
very strategic decision made by a firm to gain a super-normal profit. And of course, the one 
who will be in charge of this strategic task is an entrepreneur
5.  
As an aside, even if it is logical to represent the function of entrepreneurship in the RBV, 
how can we recognize the relationship between the RBV and entrepreneurship? For 
recognizing this relationship, Casson (2004) helpfully points out that resource-based theory 
highlights the importance of human resources, as reflected in competencies and capabilities, 
to the performance of the firm (Teece & Pisano, 1994). The theory of entrepreneurship 
simply asserts that the abilities of the entrepreneur are the principal human resource 
possessed by the firm. Other resources, such as the capabilities of scientists and managers, 
derive from those of the entrepreneur, since it is the entrepreneur who has selected the 
people with these capabilities to work for the firm
6 (Casson, 2004). 
Besides his remarks on the relationship between entrepreneurship and the RBV, Casson 
made an important statement on the conceptual distinction of resources. As we formulated 
the relationship above, we made a distinction between resources and capability in 
accordance with the function of resources in general. In addition, here the concept of the 
‘abilities of the entrepreneur’ is pulled out from the category of resources by its own 
function. It is supposed that the abilities of the entrepreneur is of particular importance 
when a firm needs to make decisions such as selecting people with the right capabilities to 
                                                 
5  We treat the entrepreneur as an entity, which takes a function of entrepreneurship, whichever it is a 
particular person (entrepreneur) or not. 
6  Casson’s definition of entrepreneur is as follows: “An entrepreneur is someone who specializes in taking 
judgmental decisions about the coordination of scarce resources” (1982: 23). Central to this definition is a 
notion of a judgmental decision. This, Casson defines as a decision “where different individuals, sharing the 
same objectives and acting under similar circumstances, would make different decisions” (1982: 24). They 
would make different decision because they have “different access to information, or different interpretation of 
it”. It follows from this definition that an entrepreneur will be a person whose judgment inevitably differs from 
the judgment of others. The reward, then, for an entrepreneur derives from backing his or her judgment and 
being proved right by subsequent events (Ricketts, 2002: 71).   
  10work for the firm, as these things require the entrepreneur’s vision and strategy. “The 
essence of coordination is decision-making” (Casson, 1997: 78).  
The firm is therefore not only the unit to cooperate and coordinate resources, but also the 
one to specialize decision-making. Not all decisions are strategic and some decisions are 
matter of a routine, but routine procedures have to be designed, and this is often a strategic 
decision. When new threats or opportunities arise, procedures often need to be changed. The 
design of new procedures is an important aspect of the entrepreneurial response to a 
changing situation (Casson, 2003, 2004). Thus under some circumstances, the direction of 
resources and capabilities are not chosen without the abilities of an entrepreneur. Those are 
empowered by the entrepreneur’s abilities. The abilities of the entrepreneur here is a super-
ordinate concept to capability. Hence, the presence of the ability enables capability to be 
performed along the entrepreneur’s vision or strategy, capability enables resources to begin 
to be utilized, and the potential for the creation of service arises. The main source of the 
competitive advantage is the abilities of the entrepreneur. We can formulate the relationship 
as  
 
S = f (E, C, R)    
for some general function f (.) so that E, C, and R are the parameters of S, where E is the 
quality of entrepreneur’s decision making, C is capacity of capability, R is resources, and 
S is service. 
 
While both invoking and amending the RBV from the entrepreneurial point of view, if we 
take the goal of corporate strategy to be the creation of entrepreneurial rents, then the 
objective of strategy is defined as follow: 
Strategy is the function of a firm to obtain an entrepreneurial rent by exploiting the factor 
markets disequilibrium (i.e., to maximize the difference between the ex ante values of 
inputs and the ex post values of outputs in a dynamic world) through firm-specific 
capabilities and resources which are directed by the abilities of an entrepreneur (originating 
from the heterogeneous perception of the entrepreneur).   
 
3.2 Exploiting the Disequilibrium 
In the preceding section, we made a critical assessment of the RBV. It becomes clear that 
the RBV has its own traits and potential as an academic thought when we grasp it in a 
dynamic context. Now we have to explore how to exploit the factor markets disequilibrium 
in order to create the entrepreneurial rents. Here we will suggest two ways for the 
exploitation. One is ‘entrepreneurial arbitration’ and the other is ‘entrepreneurial 
innovation’. Both of them share a fundamental proposition: the existence of unexploited 
opportunities that no one exploits, while each of them have crucial distinction in terms of 
their perception toward the market process in which the entrepreneur perform their role. 
  11The former is the way to create the rents as a return to the entrepreneur’s alertness in the 
process of a new equilibrium  (Choi, 1995; Gick, 2002; Hebert & Link, 1982). An 
entrepreneur gains a profit by means of adjusting the value differentiation of any factors in 
the existing market. For instance, if different price prevail in the same market, there is scope 
for profitable arbitrage between the two segments of the market. Or if the prices of inputs 
are out of line with the prices of outputs then there is scope for expanding the production of 
some products at the expense of others (Casson, 2003). It is nothing to say that we can 
interpret the entrepreneurial arbitration as the concept belongs to the category of ‘accuracy’ 
and ‘speed’. Adjusting the differentiation of resource value more accurately and more 
quickly than other individuals is one of the main ways to exploit the disequilibrium.  
On the contrary, ‘entrepreneurial innovation’ is the way to create the rents as a return to 
an entrepreneur’s discovery of new combinations as disturbing a process of equilibrium 
(Choi, 1995; Gick, 2002; Hebert & Link, 1982). For instance, the entrepreneur conducts 
innovation which is manifested in the introduction of new products or products with new 
qualities, new production processes, new markets, the use of new raw materials and other 
intermediate products, and the formation of new organization (Schumpeter, 1934). Creating 
the differentiation of resource value proactively with other individuals is one of the main 
ways to exploit the disequilibrium. It goes without saying that the former is consistent with 
the thought of the Austrian school or Kirznerian (e.g., Kirzner, 1985) and the latter is 
consistent with that of Schumpeterian (Schumpeter, 1934). Casson shows the distinction 
clearly as follows: 
  
The Austrian market process is usually construed, in neoclassical terms, as asserting that 
markets are always out of equilibrium, and that entrepreneurial interventions tend to 
move markets towards equilibrium, without them ever reaching that state. This 
interpretation presumes, however, that the markets already exist: this is reflected in the 
reference to entrepreneurial activities as speculation or arbitrage ― both of these 
activities which take place in established markets. Radical forms of market-making
7 
entrepreneurship, however, involve designing products or specifying services which did 
not previously exist, and for which there was therefore no market. In absence of the 
entrepreneur, therefore, it is not the case that markets would be merely out of 
equilibrium, as the Austrian view suggests, but that markets would not exist at all. 
(Casson, 2004)  
 
                                                 
7  Casson (2004) remarks that ‘market-making’ or ‘creating new markets’ is not the only form of 
entrepreneurial activity, but it is an important and often neglected one. We treat here the market-making 
activity as one of the disruptive or radical innovations, while most of innovation has incremental 
characteristics.       
  12As one of the most important entrepreneurial activities, Casson (2004) emphasizes the 
identification of changes in patterns of demand and creation of new markets by bringing 
together suppliers of inputs and consumers of outputs. We can paraphrase the market-
making activity as an innovation to realize a future value system through the new 
combinations of resources in the present time and space, while the arbitration is merely 
exploiting the unexploited opportunities in the present existing market. It is not necessary 
for the purpose of this paper to enter into a detailed discussion on this distinction. It is 
enough to mention here only that there are two ways for exploiting the factor markets 
disequilibrium, i.e., adjusting the differentiation of resource value, and creating the 
differentiation of resource value. 
 
3.3 Illustration of New Perspective 
It follows from what has been said that firms (hierarchy) and other forms of business 
organization (arms length transactions, M&A, strategic alliances, etc.) serve as experimental 
incubators for the entrepreneurial visions of various and varied resource combinations that 
reflect the particular perceptions of the entrepreneurs. Finally, we take some examples here 
to illustrate the new perspective for further empirical studies: the adjustment of the 
differentiation of resource value through the M&A, and the creation of the differentiation of 
resource value through the strategic alliances.       
 
Adjusting the differentiation. The factor markets are often in disequilibrium. This 
provides a firm with opportunities to acquire resources that are more valuable than other 
firms believe them to be. By exploiting the disequilibrium, the firm will have the chance to 
create a super-normal profit. Perhaps the M&A is one of the typical options that provide a 
firm with opportunities to exploiting the disequilibrium, i.e., to acquire resources that are 
currently undervalued in the market, and to identify the correct value of them through the 
M&A.  
If a firm overestimates a return potential from the resource that is acquired through the 
M&A, the firm will probably sustain an economic loss in the long run. Thus, as a result, the 
firm gains the competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis the competitor of the firm gain the 
competitive advantage. In the same context, if a firm underestimates a return potential from 
the resource that is acquired through the M&A, the competitor of the firm gain the 
competitive advantage, if they estimate the value of the resources more higher than the firm 
and acquire them at the price less than the actual vale of it. 
Although such a valuation has to be made implicitly whenever the M&A is conducted, 
the valuation of resources held by other firms is inherently difficult to make. Different firms 
  13will have different perceptions, which reflecting the disequilibrium in the factor markets
8. 
This is a reason why mistake are often made in the M&A, and a reason why successful 
firms can earn substantial profits through the deals.  
Perceptions toward risk and uncertainty are essentially subjective and relative. These 
different perceptions provided a firm with opportunities to acquire someone’s resources, 
which were more valuable than other firms believed them to be
9. Thus the M&A is a way 
(or experimental incubator) for a firm to identify the real value of those resources, and their 
quality of perceptions toward resources as well. 
 
Creating the differentiation. On the other hand, there is no existing market in the phase of 
the market-making, thus a firm will not able to identify any value of resources unless they 
create the new market where these resources are utilized. Because few firms possess enough 
resources in order to establish the new market, strategic alliances are one of the useful 
options for the firm to overcome the resource restrictions.  
 In this phase, there was a great deal of risk and uncertainty, because no one confirms 
whether the market would be expanding or not. Some firms may perceive a low risk where 
other firms perceive considerable risk to engage in the market-making process. Hence, each 
of them have to evaluate how much they should engage in the alliances, how much they 
should invest in resources they bring into the alliance, and the value of resources that allies 
bring into the alliances. Different firms will arrive at different perceptions, reflecting the 
markets disequilibrium for any resources.   
In a valuation process, strategic alliances are normally joined if all allies are relatively 
optimistic about the market prospects, and the value of the resources that they bring into the 
alliance. It is, however, inherently difficult to perceive the future of the market, and the 
value of the resources that allies bring into. This is the reason why most of strategic 
alliances are in vain. Some firms strongly take part in the alliance, while others often decide 
to withdraw from the alliance, or just put their name on the list of the ally. On the other 
hand, if all allies share the optimistic perceptions, they can probably earn substantial profits 
through the alliance. 
Perceptions toward risk and uncertainty are essentially subjective and relative. These 
different perceptions provided a firm with opportunities to realize the value of any resources, 
those are unvalued (value are unknown) in the present time and space, in the future market. 
The strategic alliance is a way (or experimental incubator) for firms to identify the real 
                                                 
8 The managerial foresight or the ‘accurate expectations of return potential of the strategy’ that Barney (1986) 
noted is similar to one of our concepts, i.e., ‘entrepreneurial arbitration’ (adjusting the value differentiation in 
the factor market). 
9 If resources cannot be acquired in the market because of its nature (e.g., knowledge embedded in routine 
work, skills of labor, a variety of know-how pertaining to technology and production), these resources can be 
more efficiently acquired through the strategic alliances, e.g., an inter-organizational learning. 
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and these resources. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
To begin with, a brief survey was given on the conceptual framework of the RBV by 
contrast with the CFA. The first point we examined was Barney’s fundamental concept of 
the RBV. From a static point of view, we showed that his concept of ‘valuable’ and ‘rare’ 
resources does not fulfill the conditions for acquiring and realizing a competitive advantage. 
Because firstly, either the investment necessary to build up resources and the demand-side 
characteristics that ought to evaluate the value of these resources are exogenous to his 
framework. Secondly, after remunerating all the factors of production, no competitive 
advantage has been left to a firm whether the firm possesses ‘rare’ resources or not. All of 
the ‘rare’ resources ought to be of value to their owner. On the contrary, from a dynamic 
point of view, we could find an implied possibility in his framework that the competitive 
advantage may come from ‘imperfections in the factors markets’. Different firms and 
different owners in these markets will have different expectations about the future value of 
those resources that create this imperfection. Therefore, different perceptions toward 
resources produce the possibility of a competitive advantage. This indicates that the abilities 
of the entrepreneur lie in discovering how to generate the real economic value with their 
resources in ways that others cannot anticipate.  
The second point considered was the relationship between resources, capabilities, and the 
abilities of the entrepreneur, by invoking Casson’s work. We suggested that the main source 
of competitive advantage does not fall into the heterogeneity of resources and capabilities 
per se, but the heterogeneous perceptions of the entrepreneur. The abilities of the 
entrepreneur enable capabilities to be performed along the entrepreneur’s vision or strategy, 
capabilities enable resources to begin to be utilized, and the potential for the creation of 
output arises. By treating the relationship as such, we concluded that the objective of 
strategy is as follows: strategy is the function of a firm to obtain an entrepreneurial rent by 
exploiting the factor markets disequilibrium (i.e., to maximize the difference between ex 
ante values of inputs and ex post values of outputs in a dynamic world) through firm-
specific capabilities and resources which are directed by the abilities of an entrepreneur 
(originating from the heterogeneous perception of the entrepreneur).  
After mentioning two ways for creating entrepreneurial rents, i.e., entrepreneurial 
arbitration and entrepreneurial innovation, we took some examples to illustrate the new 
perspective we have developed for further empirical studies. 
Although many scholars have contributed to identify the mechanism of sustainable 
competitive advantage through the RBV of strategic management, Priem and Butler (2001b) 
hope that the entrepreneurial strategic decision process and the RBV will each receive a 
deserved level of scholars’ attention, fewer attempts have been made to grasp the role of 
  15entrepreneurship as the source of competitive advantage. In order to deepen the 
understanding of the source of sustainable competitive advantage of a firm, we have to pay 
attention on not only to the ex post mechanisms in which a firm manage to assure the 
realization of certain value, but also to the ex ante mechanisms in which an entrepreneur 
attempt to exploit the differences in their perception toward the risk and uncertainty. This 
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